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Abstract
The author discusses how the excessive focus of 
European countries on national priorities have 
been leading to a number of structural problems, in 
the European defence market, related to interna-
tional competition, military redundancies and 
unnecessary costs. The article reflects on the recent 
efforts by the EU to support the Europen Defense 
and Technological Industrial Base and it concludes 
with some thoughts on the challenges facing the 
EU and the European defence market. The paper is 
structured in three major parts. First, it provides an 
overview of recent initiatives on EU defence. Sec-
ond, it examines the latest developments designed 
to turn these initiatives into action. Third, it con-
cludes by outlining some strategic elements impor-
tant in the context of future European defence, 
notably the required balance between the political 
will of Member States, the European financial 
incentives for defence and the potential interest of 
European industry on these incentives.
Resumo
O Mercado Europeu da Defesa e as Indústrias: 
Novas Iniciativas, Novos Desafios
O autor parte da afirmação de que, uma excessiva 
atenção dos países europeus sobre as suas priorida-
des nacionais no plano da defesa tem causado pro-
blemas estruturais no âmbito do mercado de defesa 
europeu relacionados com questões de concorrên-
cia, redundância de meios militares e desnecessá-
rios custos adicionais. Examinam-se os esforços 
recentemente desenvolvidos relativos ao apoio da 
Base Industrial e Tecnológica da Defesa Europeia e 
conclui refletindo sobre os desafios que a União 
Europeia e o mercado de defesa europeu enfren-
tam. O artigo estrutura-se em três partes. A pri-
meira oferece uma perspetiva sobre as iniciativas 
recentemente desenvolvidas no domínio da defesa 
europeia. A segunda examina em que medida 
aqueles desenvolvimentos se têm traduzido em 
ações concretas no quadro da defesa europeia. Por 
último, conclui com algumas considerações estraté-
gicas importantes no quadro do futuro da defesa 
europeia, nomeadamente o equilíbrio a alcançar 
entre a vontade dos Estados Membros, os incenti-
vos europeus no plano da defesa e o interesse da 
indústria europeia em utilizar aqueles incentivos.
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Introduction
It is difficult to define the exact nature of the European Defence Technological and 
Industrial Base (EDTIB). In reality, there is still as yet no single defence market in 
Europe. This is despite the fact that successive rounds of consolidation have led to 
the creation of so-called ‘European champions’ such as Airbus and/or MBDA 
Missile Systems. In today’s Europe, defence markets are still largely national and 
they are concentrated in a few countries such as France, Germany, Italy, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK). A number of other countries such as Austria, 
Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Poland, Portugal and the Netherlands 
also maintain certain elements of a defence industrial base. The rule still seems to be 
that defence spending takes place on a purely national basis. According to the Euro-
pean Defence Agency (EDA), in 2015 about 82% of equipment spending and 92.2% 
of Research and Technology (R&T) investment occurred on a national basis (Euro-
pean Defence Agency, 2017). Yet major European collaborative programmes have 
still been possible to initiate. There is the example of the Eurofighter (Germany, 
Spain and the UK), the FREMM frigate (France and Italy), the NH90 helicopter 
(multiple countries) and the A400M transport aircraft (multiple countries). 
Cooperation in bilateral and minilateral formats have produced mixed results, but 
none have been advanced through an European Union (EU) framework. The 
tendency towards national priorities has led to a number of structural problems in 
the European defence market related to international competition and military 
redundancies and costs. 
Let us first consider the market aspects. In 2015, European industries achieved a 
€222 billion turnover representing a sector breakdown of civil aeronautics (51%), 
land and naval (24%), military aeronautics (22%) and space (3%). Close to 848,000 
people are directly employed in the sector in Europe (ASD Europe, 2017). Although 
defence spending has started to rise in the EU mainly following the actions of 
Russia in Ukraine, the EU still experiences duplication and waste. For example, the 
European Parliament estimates that if EU Member States were to cooperate further 
in defence-industrial matters they could save up to €26 billion per year (European 
Parliament, 2017). The European Commission have drawn attention to the costs of 
duplication. In the EU there are 17 different types of main battle tanks (MBT), in the 
United States (US) just 1. In the EU there are 29 different types of destroyers and 
frigates, in the US only 4. In the EU there are 20 variants of fighter planes, but there 
are only 6 types in the US (European Commission, 2017a). 
In addition to these costs and duplications is the EU’s geopolitical outlook. It is no 
secret that Europe is experiencing a sustained deterioration in its security land-
scape. Threats on the southern and eastern neighbourhoods pose challenges such 
as nuclear and conventional threats (Russia), migration, terrorism (Sahel), energy 
insecurity and hybrid threats. 
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The EU also faces questions of unity. ‘Brexit’ is the most severe case that poses huge 
challenges for Europe’s defence markets. One must also consider the shifting nature 
of the transatlantic relationship. As the EU Global Strategy makes clear, Europe has 
no real option but to strive for its own strategic autonomy in security and defence 
(EU Global Strategy, 2016). A major question driving policy in Brussels today is: can 
the EU fully rely on the security bargain that has emerged since 1945 and what 
more can the Union do for itself? ‘Strategic autonomy’, a term that has traditionally 
made some Member States weary, increasingly seems to drive forward EU coopera-
tion on defence. 
The EU is no stranger to shaping the European defence market, for in 2009 the 
European Commission developed legislation on defence procurement (directive 
2009/81/EC) and intra-EU defence transfers (directive 2009/43/EC). In the past 
year or so, however, the EU has launched a Coordinated Annual Review on Defence 
(CARD), a European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation 
(PESCO). Since the British decision to leave the EU, the bulk of the remaining 
members have seized on a ‘window of opportunity’ to move forward on defence-
industrial cooperation. Initiatives such as Coordinated Annual Review on Defence 
(CARD), European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation 
(PESCO) were all adopted in the space of about a year having in previous years and 
decades not developed defence-industrial policy very far. This paper reflects on the 
recent efforts by the EU to support the EDTIB and it concludes with some thoughts 
on the challenges facing the EU and the European defence market. The paper is 
structured in three major parts: (1) an overview of recent initiatives on EU defence; 
(2) the latest developments designed to turn these visions into action; and (3) a 
conclusion that outlines some strategic elements for the EU to consider in the future. 
What is the EU’s Role?
Coordinated Annual Review on Defence
Despite the existence of NATO, a number of European countries have in recent 
months decided to advance their defence-industrial cooperation through the EU. 
This began on 14 November 2016 with the creation of the CARD. Initially conceived 
of as a ‘European semester on defence’ (to mirror the EU’s economic policy equiva-
lent), the CARD is designed to ensure that individual national defence plans are 
coordinated at the EU level. EU Member States recognised that there is a need to 
‘deepen defence cooperation and ensure more optimal use, including coherence, of 
defence spending plans’ (Council of the EU, 2016). Planning for defence on a purely 
national basis, while maintaining some notion of sovereignty, has led to the types 
of duplication and costs mentioned in the introduction to this paper. Under 
CARD, the idea is for national defence planners to share information with fellow 
EU Member States on their budgetary planning cycles and future capability/ 
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technology plans. Once this information is shared, it is thought that the CARD can 
help EU Member States identify common capability shortfalls, potential areas of 
joint capability development and future collaboration on defence research. 
Therefore, if the EU Global Strategy called for the ‘gradual synchronisation and 
mutual adaptation of national defence planning cycles and capability development 
practices’, the CARD is the mechanism designed to meet these objectives (EU 
Global Strategy, 2016, pp. 20-21). As the ‘CARD secretariat’, the EDA will be 
expected to report to EU defence ministers on a biennial basis. However, CARD 
will be a voluntary – Member State-driven – mechanism. As the Council conclu-
sions of 6 March 2017 make clear, CARD will not entail a one-size-fits-all approach 
to defence planning but provide ‘a better overview at EU level of issues such as 
defence spending and national investment as well as defence research efforts’ 
(Council of the EU, 2017). This, of course, poses some challenges for the EU as 
voluntary approaches to defence cooperation have underperformed in the past. For 
example, in 2007 the EDA Member States agreed to voluntary and collective defence 
benchmarks on defence spending, R&T investment and European collaboration 
that have not consistently been met in the past. A key question is whether a volun-
tary CARD can overcome past behaviour on defence cooperation on the part of the 
EU Member States.
European Defence Fund
A second major initiative developed by the EU since 2016 is the EDF. The Fund is 
designed to use the EU budget to support defence research and capability develop-
ment. Although still in an early stage, there are presently two preparatory elements 
to the defence fund. First, for defence research to be secured as a fully-fledged 
‘European Defence Research Programme’ (EDRP) after 2020 (when the new EU 
budget cycle begins), the European Commission has initiated a ‘Preparatory Action 
on Defence Research’ (PADR). For the years up to 2020, the PADR has a budgetary 
allocation of €90 million – the EU will cover up to 100% of the eligible costs of 
defence research financed under the PADR. After 2020, it is hoped that an EDRP can 
secure €500 million per year. The PADR has already started funding defence 
research programmes at the EU level. In 2017, an initial call for proposals under 
PADR received 24 concrete proposals involving almost 190 entities such as firms 
and research institutes. 
With a budget of €25 million in 2017 (the overall €90 million up to 2020 is divided 
into yearly amounts), the EU is presently funding defence research projects on stra-
tegic technology foresight (a project led an Italian firm); maritime surveillance and 
interdiction (involving firms and research institutes Estonia, France, Greece, Italy, 
Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom); 
adaptive camouflage for soldiers (involving firms from France, Germany, Lithua- 
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nia, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden); complex data and communication 
soldier systems (involving Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Spain and Sweden); and, finally, protective soldier clothing (involving Finland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain). 
The EDF also seeks to fund capability development programmes. This part of 
the fund is less developed in terms of concrete funding programmes. Whereas 
PADR prepares the ground for an EDRP after 2020, a European Defence Industrial 
Development Programme (EDIDP) will set the ground work for a fully-fledged 
capability fund post-2020 by investing €500 million into EU capability develop-
ment from 2019-2020. The EDIDP is currently working its way through the EU’s 
legislative process – the European Commission have prepared a draft Regulation 
on the EDIDP and the Council of the EU and the European Parliament have 
provided their feedback. The institutions have now met on three occasions during 
the first half of 2018 to discuss the final regulation. Unlike the PADR/EDRP, which 
are financed up to 100% of eligible costs, the EDIDP and eventual capability window 
will only have an eligible cost ceiling of 20% of EU funding. This means that the 
remaining 80% of funding for capability development should still come from the 
Member States. Post-2020, it is assumed that the EU will invest €1 billion per year 
into capability development and this should have a minimum leveraging effect of 
€5 billion per year when Member State contributions are combined.
There is as yet no clear definition on what capabilities the EU will support under 
the EDIDP. All one does know at present is the approach and objective of the Euro-
pean Commission and what they want to achieve vis-à-vis the EDTIB. In fact, the 
legal basis for the EDIDP is Article 173 of the Lisbon Treaty and it clearly states that: 
“The Union and the Member States shall ensure that the conditions necessary for 
the competitiveness of the Union’s industry exist. For that purpose, in accordance 
with a system of open and competitive markets, their action shall be aimed at: 
speeding up the adjustment of industry to structural changes; encouraging an envi-
ronment favourable to initiative and to the development of undertakings throughout 
the Union, particularly small and medium-sized undertakings; encouraging an 
environment favourable to cooperation between undertakings; and fostering better 
exploitation of the industrial potential of policies of innovation, research and tech-
nological development”. The overarching rationale, therefore, is clearly to improve 
the competitiveness of Europe’s defence market. 
Permanent Structured Cooperation
Another major breakthrough on EU defence-industrial policy in 2017 was the ini- 
tiation of PESCO, which is an ‘ambitious, binding and inclusive’ framework aimed 
at incentivising cooperation among Member States in the field of defence capability 
development and operations. Accordingly, the 25 Member States that have joined 
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PESCO have accepted 20 commitments and are (in smaller groups of Member 
States) part of a first wave of 17 capability projects. The aim of PESCO is to raise 
defence spending in a concerted manner, develop military capabilities jointly, and 
make their military assets available for operations. Joining PESCO is voluntary. 
Activities carried out in the framework of PESCO can have either a capability or an 
operational dimension. Both commitments and projects will be the object of regular 
assessment by the High Representative for the Union’s Foreign and Security Policy/
Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP) with the support of the EDA 
and the European External Action Service (EEAS). The industry-related PESCO 
commitments include: regularly increasing defence budgets in real terms and 
increased defence investment and research expenditure; involvement in the EDF to 
increase joint capability projects; and to fill capability shortcomings, plus many 
more. 
In terms of the PESCO projects, a first wave of 17 projects has been identified in 
2018 and they are designed to promote cross-border cooperation between EU 
Member States. The projects in phase one include: a European Medical Command 
(9 Member States); European Secure Software Defined Radio (8); Network of 
Logistic Hubs in Europe and Support to Operations (13); Military Mobility (24); EU 
Training Mission Competence Centre (13); European Training Certification Centre 
for European Armies (2); Energy Operational Function (4); Deployable Military 
Disaster Relief Capability Package (5); Maritime (semi-Autonomous) Systems for 
Mine Countermeasures (6); Harbour and Maritime Surveillance and Protection (4); 
Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance (7); Cyber Threats and Incident Response Infor-
mation Sharing Platform (7); Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance 
in Cyber Security (7); Strategic Command and Control (C2) System for CSDP 
Missions and Operations (4); Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle/Amphibious 
Assault Vehicle/Light Armoured Vehicle (3); Indirect Fire Support (EuroArtillery 
– 2); and EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core (5). 
Compared with previous EU efforts in the defence domain, the added-value of 
PESCO comes from the combination of the nature of commitments that Member 
States will make, the accountability that the framework creates for Member States 
and the permanence of the framework. Taken together, these elements are supposed 
to shape national mindsets and practices, and in the end the form of cooperation, in 
a way never observed in the past. PESCO is supposed to lead to greater capability 
cooperation and industrial synchronisation. Although not all of the PESCO projects 
currently have an industrial/capability development dimension, this is the start of 
a process that should lead to the identification and development of new capabilities 
for the EU. It should also be stated that the European Defence Fund may also be 
instrumentalised to support capability development within PESCO. For example, 
the European Commission have stated that the 20% of eligible costs that they will 
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cover under the EDIDP/capability fund could eventually be increased to 30% for 
projects placed within PESCO. 
Challenges on the Horizon?
The initiatives outlined above mark in many ways a quantum shift in the way the 
EU deals with defence-industrial issues and the EDTIB. There remain a number of 
questions, however, about the CARD, the EDF and PESCO. First, for PESCO there 
are questions about how far the Member States will adhere to the 20 binding 
commitments made to one another. PESCO is based on an annual review but there 
is no automatic sanctioning mechanism for states that do not meet their commit-
ments, except for other Member States agreeing to exclude a Member State/s from 
PESCO. This is unlikely to happen when political considerations are kept in mind. 
Given the known challenges associated with capability development initiatives 
outside of the EU framework, there is a need to ensure that the EDF and PESCO do 
not fall prey to the same pitfalls. Clearly, EDF and PESCO capability projects should 
meet the objectives of CSDP and European defence more broadly, but there is a 
need to ensure that capability programmes are sufficiently ambitious to stimulate 
the buy-in of ministries of defence and industry (even if PESCO and the EDF are 
not designed to subsidise ongoing capability development projects). Capability 
development is a long-term process spanning multiple years and decades, and so 
success through EDF/PESCO has to be measured with this in mind. Achieving a 
mutually reinforcing relationship between PESCO, the EDF and CARD is still a 
work in progress. 
Second, it will be crucial to achieve industry buy-in to the EDF. The European 
defence market is built on a complex defence supply chain that is comprised of a 
range of private, semi-private and public primes, midcaps and small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs). If the European Commission is ambitious about the types of 
defence capability projects that could be launched under the ‘capability window’ of 
the EDF, then the European defence supply chain as a whole may likely have to buy 
into the financial incentives on offer too. It will be critical to get primes, midcaps 
and SMEs on board, but the question is how to do so across borders in Europe. 
Member States that have a relatively small defence industry might be interested in 
the EDF for their SMEs, but EDF projects will require more than SMEs and midcaps 
if the EU is to develop truly ambitious defence capabilities. Prime firms will be 
needed to develop high-value systems, but the challenge here is that many of these 
firms still see governments as the major customers and investors in the defence 
sector. The challenge facing the European Commission is thus two-fold: first, how 
to stop the EDF being seen as a subsidy for SMEs in smaller Member States; and 
second, how to ensure that EDF projects do not just benefit prime firms in the larger 
Member States. This will be a delicate balance to achieve. 
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Finally, there is another challenge related to the use of the EU budget for defence 
capability development and support to the defence supply chain. To put it rather 
candidly, the EU budget is built on contributions from every EU Member State, 
but the ‘capability window’ appears to be geared to projects taken up by only a 
handful of willing Member States. This begs the question: can a common resource 
such as the EU budget be used to support the needs of a handful of EU Member 
States? 
This could be a test of solidarity and indicate how far Member States view invest-
ments made through the EDF, with EU budget support, as a common public good 
for the whole of the EU. Here, one needs to keep in mind that national parliaments 
and ministries of defence will also have a say on how the EDF is used. This chal-
lenge may even invite some creative thinking as to how capabilities that are eventu-
ally developed under the EDF could be pooled, loaned, or utilised by the whole of 
the EU at some point. This is especially true in a PESCO context.
Conclusion
This paper has outlined recent efforts by the EU to support the EDTIB. The paper 
provided an overview of recent initiatives on EU defence and the latest develop-
ments designed to turn these visions into action. The paper has also considered 
some (non-exhaustive) strategic elements and questions for the EU to consider. 
What is clear with EDF, CARD and PESCO is that EU Member States do finally 
seem to understand that EU defence cooperation is a good way of ensuring the 
competitiveness of Europe’s defence industry and capability development in the 
future. Yet, as signaled at the start of this paper it is unclear how – in the short term 
at least – EU Member States are willing to give up their national prerogatives in 
favour of a single European defence market. We are still at an early stage in devel-
opments, but the EDF and PESCO in particular are configured to rely heavily on the 
political will of Member States. Without Member States – who will ultimately 
develop and use military capabilities – the EDF and PESCO cannot be a success. 
The impact of these initiatives on the EDTIB is still unclear – the truth is it is too 
early to say –, but there is great promise in the efforts taken by the EU. 
The EU has achieved much in putting forward the idea for an EDF, CARD and 
PESCO. As a policy response to the need to push European defence-industrial 
cooperation to the next level, the EU institutions and Member States have devised 
a range of innovative policy initiatives. Although financial incentives have been 
used in national defence procurement processes for many years, using financial 
incentives at the EU level is new and exciting terrain. The challenges ahead are 
myriad including: how will a balanced EDTIB be achieved? How will industry buy 
into the EDF/PESCO? How will the EDF transition from defence research to capa-
bility development? What are the capability development priorities? 
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Much depends on the EU Member States and whether they seize on the incentives 
put on the table by the European Commission. While it is up to the Member States 
to politically engage with the EDF, CARD and PESCO, the EU can in the meantime 
continue to stoke industry’s interest but also listen to their specific needs. The task 
of thinking about what defence capabilities the EU should prioritise begins in 
earnest.
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